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This paper unifies the theories of Nash implementation and Bayesian implementation.
Environments considered are such that each agent's characteristics include, in addition to a
specification of his private information, a commonly known type parameter, while both
attributes are unknown to the designer. Each social choice correspondence (SCC) assigns a
commonly known type vector to a social choice set. Conditions that fully characterize an
implementable SCC in economic environments where agents are not satiated generalize and
merge respective conditions in the complete information model of Danilov (1992) and the
incomplete information model of Jackson (1991).
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In this paper, we provide a uniﬁed framework in which the theories of both Nash implemen 
tation and Bayesian (Nash) implementation can be accommodated. We also discuss whether
Danilov’s (1992) notion of essential elements can be used to ﬁll the gap between the necessary
and suﬃcient conditions of implementation in noneconomic environments.
An environment is called economic if agents cannot be simultaneously satiated, and
noneconomic otherwise. The problem of implementing social choice sets in both economic
and noneconomic environments involving agents that have incomplete information about
the state of the society is examined by Jackson (1991). He deﬁnes social choice functions
from states to allocations, and social choice sets as collections of social choice functions.
His contributions establish that social choice sets are Bayesian implementable only if they
satisfy closure (C), incentive compatibility (IC), and Bayesian monotonicity (BM) condi 
tions. Moreover, these three conditions are suﬃcient to implement a social choice set in any
economic environment involving at least three agents.1 Unfortunately, the same suﬃciency
result does not hold in noneconomic environments. Jackson shows that a social choice set in
any noneconomic environment is implementable if it satisﬁes (C), (IC) and monotonicity no 
veto (MNV), a condition combining Bayesian monotonicity and no veto conditions. Since
(MNV) is not necessary, there exists a gap between necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
Bayesian implementation in noneconomic environments. Jackson is quick to realize that
Danilov’s (1989) single condition, namely essential monotonicity (EM), that characterizes
Nash implementable social choice correspondences can be helpful along this line.2
Danilov (1989, 1992) shows that any Nash implementable social choice correspondence
(SCC)   from preferences to alternatives   is essentially monotone. Conversely, if a SCC is
essentially monotone and there are at least three agents in the environment, then the SCC
is implementable via Nash equilibria. Essential monotonicity is stronger than monotonicity,
a necessary condition for Nash implementation. On the other hand, essential monotonicity
is weaker than monotonicity + no veto power, which are suﬃcient conditions of Nash im 
plementation when there are at least three agents, a fact proved by Maskin (1977, 1999).
Analogously, to reduce the gap in Bayesian implementation, we wish carefully translate (EM)
to get a condition stronger than (BM) while weaker than (MNV).
The environment that we consider diﬀers from that of Jackson in two aspects. First,
an agent’s characteristics include, in addition to a speciﬁcation of his private information,
a commonly known type parameter. The two attributes are both unknown to the designer.
Second, instead of social choice sets, we deal with social choice correspondences assigning the
commonly known types of individuals to social choice sets. Like in Jackson’s model, however,
each social choice function within a given social choice set maps the private type proﬁles to
allocations. The problem of implementation is then to design a strategic outcome function
whose equilibria for any environment coincides with the social choice correspondence.
1See, also, Matsushima (1990) for similar results in economic environments.
2A full characterization of necessary and suﬃcient conditions of Nash implementation is due to Moore
and Repullo (1990). Danilov’s (1989, 1992) single condition reduces Moore and Repullo’s three conditions
to one.
1The distinction in the environment with regard to the previous literature has an important
implication. In a single framework, we merge Nash implementation model and Bayesian
implementation model. We show that conditions characterizing implementable social choice
correspondences select, up to some required generalizations and modiﬁcations, from the
respective conditions for Nash implementation and Bayesian implementation.
Any SCC in our framework is implementable only if it satisﬁes conditions generalizing
Danilov’s essential monotonicity and Jackson’s closure, incentive compatibility and Bayesian
monotonicity provided that the domain of preferences is suﬃciently rich. In economic envi 
ronments involving rich preference domains and at least three agents, the same conditions
are also suﬃcient to fully implement a SCC. However, in noneconomic environments the
suﬃciency conditions must involve a generalized monotonicity no veto (GMNV) condition
replacing generalized Bayesian monotonicity.
Two particular cases within our uniﬁed framework are of a special interest. In one extreme
case in which the information set of each agent is a singleton, the model boils down to the
Nash implementation model considered by Danilov. In the other extreme case in which the
society is known to have a single type, the model coincides with Bayesian implementation
model of Jackson.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the environment that heavily bor 
rows from Jackson (1991), and deﬁnes social choice correspondences. Section 3 provides
the deﬁnitions that generalize and merge the notions in the Bayesian model of Jackson and
the complete information model of Danilov. In Section 4 we describe the implementation




There are a ﬁnite number, N, of agents. Agent i has two attributes θi and si. The
parameter θi is common knowledge while si is privately known by agent i. Henceforth, we
will use the term type for θi and information set for si.
Let Θi be the set of possible types of agent i. A type proﬁle is a vector θ = (θ1,...,θN)
and the set of all type proﬁles is Θ = Θ1 × ... × ΘN. Let Si describe the ﬁnite number of
possible information sets of agent i. A state is a vector s = (s1,...,sN) and the set of states
is S = S1 × ... × SN. Both the type proﬁle and the state of the society are unknown to the
designer.
Let A denote the set of feasible allocations. We assume A is ﬁxed across states.
A social choice function is a map from states to allocations. The set of all social choice
functions is X = {x|x : S → A}.
Each agent i has a probability measure qi deﬁned on S.3 It is assumed that if qi(s) > 0
for some i and s ∈ S, then qj(s) > 0 for all j  = i. All agents agree on that T denotes the
set of states which occur with positive probability, where T = {s ∈ S|qi(s) > 0, ∀i}.
3For notational simplicity and with no loss of generality in our results, we assume that qi is type 
independent.
2The sets Πi are partitions of T deﬁned by qi. For a given information set si ∈ Si,
πi(si) = {t ∈ S|ti = si and qi(t) > 0} denotes the set of states which agent i believes may
be the true state. It is assumed that πi(si)  = ∅ for all i and si ∈ Si. Let Π denote the ﬁnest
partition which is coarser than each Πi. For a given state s ∈ S, let π(s) be the element of
Π which contains s.
A preference is a linear order on X. The set of all preferences is denoted as R. Each
agent has preferences over social choice functions which have a conditional expected utility
representation. Given x,y ∈ X, si ∈ Si, and θ ∈ Θ, agent i’s weak preference relation

















where Ui : A×S ×Θi → I R+ is a state and type dependent utility function. Preferences are
complete and transitive. The strict preference and indiﬀerence relations associated with Ri
are P i and Ii, respectively.
An environment is a collection [N,S,Θ,A,{qi},{Ui}], whose structure is assumed to be
common knowledge among agents.
Social Choice Correspondences
A social choice correspondence (SCC) is a nonempty subset F ⊂ Θ×X (or F : Θ ⇒ X).
A SCC F assigns to every type proﬁle θ ∈ Θ, a social choice set F(θ) ⊂ X, i.e., a collection
of social choice functions.
3. Definitions
Here, we generalize several notions in the Bayesian model of Jackson and the complete
information model of Danilov.
Let L(x,Ri(si,θi)) be the set of social choice functions to which agent i of type θi weakly
prefers x at state si. This set is deﬁned by L(x,Ri(si,θi)) = {y ∈ X|xRi(si,θi)y}.
Definition 1: The social choice functions x and y are equivalent if x(s) = y(s) for all
s ∈ T. The social choice correspondences F and ˆ F are equivalent if for each θ and x ∈ F(θ)
there exists ˆ x ∈ ˆ F(θ) which is equivalent to x, and for each θ and ˆ x ∈ ˆ F(θ) there exists
x ∈ F(θ) which is equivalent to ˆ x.
Definition 2: Let x/Cz be a splicing of two social choice functions x and z along a
set C ∈ S. The social choice function x/Cz is deﬁned by [x/Cz](s) = x(s) ∀s ∈ C, and
[x/Cz](s) = z(s) otherwise.
Definition 3: An environment is said to be economic if for any z ∈ X, θ ∈ Θ and
s ∈ S, there exist i and j (i  = j), x ∈ X and y ∈ X such that x and y are constant,
x/Cz / ∈ L(z,Ri(si,θi)) and y/Cz / ∈ L(z,Rj(sj,θj)) for all C ⊂ S such that s ∈ C. An
environment is called noneconomic if it is not economic.
3Definition 4: Let B and D be any disjoint sets of states such that B ∪D = T and for
any π ∈ Π either π ⊂ B or π ⊂ D. Consider a SCC F, and θ ∈ Θ. The social choice set
F(θ) satisﬁes closure (C) if for any x,y ∈ F(θ), there exists z ∈ F(θ) such that z(s) = x(s)
∀s ∈ B and z(s) = y(s) ∀s ∈ D. The SCC F satisﬁes generalized closure (GC) if for all θ,
F(θ) satisﬁes (C).
Given a vector or vector of functions v = (v1,...,vN), the list (v−i, ˜ vi) represents the
vector (v1,...,vi−1, ˜ vi,vi+1,...,vN).
Definition 5: Given i, x ∈ X, and ti ∈ Si, deﬁne xti by xti(s) = x(s−i,ti), s ∈ S.
Consider a SCC F, and θ ∈ Θ. The social choice set F(θ) satisﬁes incentive compatibility







The SCC F satisﬁes generalized incentive compatibility (GIC) if for all θ, F(θ) satisﬁes (IC).
Definition 6: A deception for i is a mapping αi : Si → Si. Let α = (α1,...,αN) and
α(s) = [α1(s1),...,αN(sN)]. The notation x◦α represents the social choice function which
results in x[α(s)] for each s ∈ S.
Definition 7: Consider a SCC F, θ ∈ Θ, x ∈ F(θ) and a deception α. The social
choice set F(θ) satisﬁes Bayesian monotonicity (BM) if whenever there is no social choice
function in F(θ) which is equivalent to x◦α, there exists i,si ∈ Si and y ∈ X such that
y◦α / ∈ L(x◦α,R
i(s
i,θ






The SCC F satisﬁes generalized Bayesian monotonicity (GBM) if for all θ, F(θ) satisﬁes
(BM).
Definition 8: A social choice function z ∈ X satisﬁes the no-veto hypothesis (NVH)
for α, θ and D ⊂ T, if for each s ∈ D there exists i such that for each j  = i and ˜ z ∈ X there
is a set C ⊂ D such that s ∈ C and ˜ z◦α/Cz ∈ L(z,Rj(sj,θj)).
Definition 9: Consider a SCC F, a deception α, and for each ˆ θ ∈ Θ, x ∈ F(ˆ θ), and i, a
set Bi
x,ˆ θ ⊂ Si. Let Bx,ˆ θ = B1
x,ˆ θ×...×BN
x,ˆ θ. Suppose that there exists z ∈ X such that for each
ˆ θ ∈ Θ, x ∈ F(ˆ θ) and s ∈ Bx,ˆ θ, z(s) = x◦α(s). Furthermore, suppose that z satisﬁes (NVH)
for α, θ and T − (∪ˆ θ∈Θ ∪x∈F(ˆ θ) Bx,ˆ θ). F satisﬁes generalized-monotonicity-no-veto (GMNV)
if whenever there is no social choice function in F(θ) which is equivalent to z, there exist i,
ˆ θ ∈ Θ, x ∈ F(ˆ θ), s ∈ ∪  θ∈  ΘxBx,  θ where   Θx = {θ : x ∈ F(θ)}, and y, ˜ z, and   z ∈ X, such that
  z(t) = y◦α(t) when t ∈ ∪  θ∈  ΘxBx,  θ;   z(t) = z(t) when t−i ∈ ∪  θ∈  Θ¯ xB
−i
  x,  θ for some   x such that
  x  = x; and   z(t) = ˜ z◦α(t) otherwise; and
  z / ∈ L(z,R
i(s
i,θ






If Θ is a singleton, every SCC is a social choice set; hence (GC), (GIC), (GBM) and
(GMNV), respectively, reduce to the conditions (C), (IC), (BM) and (MNV) deﬁned by
Jackson (1991) for social choice sets.4
4For the intuition underlying the involving construction of (GMNV), see the last paragraph of the proof
of Lemma 4 that provides suﬃciency conditions to show that given any θ ∈ Θ and any equilibrium σ in the
game G(M, ,θ), there exists a social choice function z ∈ F(θ) which is equivalent to  (σ).
4Definition 10: Let i be an agent and Y ⊂ X. A social choice function y ∈ Y is
essential for i in set Y if y ∈ F(θ) for some θ ∈ Θ and L(y,Ri(si,θi)) ⊂ Y for all si ∈ Si.
Given the social choice correspondence F, the set of all essential elements for i in Y ⊂ X is
denoted by Ess(F;i,Y ) or simply Ess(i,Y ). Obviously Ess(F;i,Y ) ⊂ Y , and if Z ⊂ Y ⊂ X
then Ess(i,Z) ⊂ Ess(i,Y ). Moreover, Ess(F;i,X) = ∪θ∈Θ F(θ).
Definition 11: The SCC F satisﬁes generalized-essential monotonicity (GEM) if for










imply x ∈ F(ˆ θ).
Generalized essential monotonicity means that the social choice function x survives not
only at an improvement of position of x at all states but also when its position gets nonessen 
tially worse at some states of the society. In the case in which S is a singleton, (GEM) boils
down to Danilov’s essential monotonicity condition (EM).
Definition 12: Consider any linear order ˜ R ∈ R. The environment satisﬁes rich domain
hypothesis (RDH) if for each i there exists θi ∈ Θi such that Ri(si,θi) = ˜ R for all si ∈ Si.
4. Implementation
A mechanism is an action space M = M1 × ... × MN and a map   : M → A.
A strategy for agent i is a map σi : Si → Mi. Denote by Σi the set of all strategies for
agent i, and deﬁne Σ = Σ1 × ... × ΣN.
For any σ ∈ Σ,  (σ) represents the social choice function which results when σ is played.
Let θ be a type proﬁle. A vector of strategies σ ∈ Σ is a Bayesian (Nash) equilibrium
in the game G(M, ,θ) if  (σ−i, ˜ σi) ∈ L( (σ),Ri(si,θi)) for all i,si and ˜ σi ∈ Σi. In other
words,  (σ−i,Σi) ⊂ L( (σ),Ri(si,θi)) for all i and si.
Let BE( ,θ) be the set of all Bayesian equilibria in the game G(M, ,θ). Then the set
of all equilibrium outcomes in this game is deﬁned by E( ,θ) =  (BE( ,θ)).
A mechanism (M, ) implements a social choice correspondence F if:
(i) for any θ ∈ Θ and x ∈ F(θ) there exists an equilibrium σ ∈ BE( ,θ) with  [σ(s)] =
x(s) for all s ∈ T, and
(ii) for any θ ∈ Θ and any equilibrium σ ∈ BE( ,θ) there exists x ∈ F(θ) with  [σ(s)] =
x(s) for all s ∈ T.
In other words, the mechanism (M, ) implements F if E( ) is equivalent to F. A social
choice set F is implementable if there exists a mechanism (M, ) which implements F.
5. Unifying Theories of Nash Implementation and Bayesian Implementation
This section begins with the description of essential elements for the equilibrium outcomes
correspondence, E( ). Next, we establish that E( ) satisﬁes the condition (GEM) if the
domain of preferences is suﬃciently rich. These results actually extend similar results by
Danilov (1992) obtained for the complete information case to our Bayesian framework.
5Lemma 1: Assume the environment satisﬁes (RDH). Consider a mechanism (M, ), a
set Y ⊂ X, a social choice function y ∈ Y and agent i. Then, y ∈ Ess(E( );i,Y ) if and
only if y =  (σ−i,σi) where  (σ−i,Σi) ⊂ Y .
Lemma 2: If the environment satisﬁes (RDH), then, for any mechanism (M, ), the
correspondence E( ) satisﬁes (GEM).
Theorem 1: Assume the environment is economic, satisﬁes (RDH) and N ≥ 3. A SCC
F is implementable if and only if there exists a SCC ˆ F which is equivalent to F and satisﬁes
(GC), (GIC), (GEM), and (GBM).
The assumptions that the environment is economic and N ≥ 3 are only needed for the
suﬃciency part of the Theorem. If we drop the assumption that the environment is economic,
we have the following suﬃciency theorem.
Theorem 2: Assume the environment satisﬁes (RDH) and N ≥ 3. A SCC F is im-
plementable if there exists a SCC ˆ F which is equivalent to F and satisﬁes (GC), (GIC),
(GEM), and (GMNV).
Note here that when the type space Θ is ﬁnite, the environment [N,S,Θ,A,{qi},{Ui}]
can be shown to have the same information structure and preferences as the environment
[N, ˆ S,A,{ˆ qi},{ˆ Ui}] (a standart setting in Bayesian models) with ˆ S,{ˆ qi} and {ˆ Ui} appropri 
ately deﬁned. Thus, Theorems 1 and 2 could be proven as corollaries to the corresponding
theorems in Jackson (1991) in situations where Θ is ﬁnite. This means that (GEM) is
redundant when Θ is ﬁnite.
In analyzing our ﬁrst two results, two particular cases are of a special interest. First,
consider an environment with a single state of the society. Then, the collection of SCC’s
which are equivalent to a SCC F consists simply of F itself, and every SCC satisﬁes (GC),
(GIC), (EGBM) and (GMNV) regardless (RDH) holds. So, in both economic and noneco 
nomic environments (GEM) becomes the unique suﬃciency condition if S is a singleton.
Moreover, (GEM) reduces to (EM) in such a case. Thus, we obtain the following result by
Danilov (1992) as a straightforward corollary to our previous two theorems.
Corollary 1: Assume the environment satisﬁes (RDH), #S = 1 and N ≥ 3. A social
choice correspondence F is implementable if and only if F satisﬁes (EM).
Consider now the other extreme case in which the type space contains a single element.
In this case, (GEM) has no bite, whereas (GC), (GIC), (GBM) and (GMNV) reduce to (C),
(IC), (BM) and (MNV), respectively. In addition, any SCC is a social choice set now. Thus,
we obtain Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 in Jackson (1991) as separate corollaries to our ﬁrst
and second Theorems, respectively.
Corollary 2: Assume the environment is economic, #Θ = 1 and N ≥ 3. A SCC F
is implementable if and only if there exists a SCC ˆ F which is equivalent to F and satisﬁes
(C), (IC) and (BM).
Corollary 3: Assume #Θ = 1 and N ≥ 3. A SCC F is implementable if there exists
a SCC ˆ F which is equivalent to F and satisﬁes (C), (IC), and (MNV).
6Remark 1: Assume the environment is noneconomic and satisﬁes (RDH). The condi 
tions (GC), (GIC), (GEM) and (GBM) are not suﬃcient for implementation.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: To show the “only if” part, let y ∈ Ess(E( );i,Y ). Then
y ∈ E( ,θ) for some θ such that y =  (ˆ σ−i, ˆ σi) where  (ˆ σ−i,Σi) ⊂ L(y,Ri(si,θi)) ⊂ Y
for all si ∈ Si. Conversely, let y =  (σ−i,σi) and  (σ−i,Σi) ⊂ Y . Since the environment
satisﬁes (RDH), let θ be such that L(y,Ri(si,θi)) = Y for all si and y = maxj Rj(sj,θj) for
all j  = i and sj. It is obvious that (σ−i,σi) is Bayesian equilibrium in the game G(M, ,θ),
and therefore y ∈ Ess(E( );i,Y ). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: Let σ be a Bayesian equilibrium in the game G(M, ,θ), and
x =  (σ). Then,  (σ−i,Σi) ⊂ L(x,Ri(ti,θi)) for all i and ti. By Lemma 1,  (σ−i,Σi) ⊂








for all i and ti. It follows that  (Σi,σ−i) ⊂ L(x,Ri(ti, ˆ θi)), for all i and ti. Therefore, σ is a
Bayesian equilibrium in the game G(M, , ˆ θ), and x ∈ E( , ˆ θ). Q.E.D.
Proof of Remark 1: We extend Example 1 in Jackson (1991) in order to prove





4}, Si = {si,ti}, and T = {s1 = (s1,s2,s3,s4);s2 = (s1,s2,t3,t4);s3 = (t1,t2,t3,
t4)}, the partitions pictured below represent the information structure implied by T:
States
Agents 1 and 2 [s1 s2] [s3]
Agents 3 and 4 [s1] [s2 s3]
7The functional form of the utility functions of agents 1 and 2 is the same as is that of
agents 3 and 4. The utilities representing the preferences are given below. Preferences satisfy




3}, alone, constitutes a rich domain.
Agents 1 and 2 Agents 3 and 4
a b a b
Ui(.,s1,θi
1) 2 1 1 2
Ui(.,s2,θi
1) 2 1 1 2
Ui(.,s3,θi
1) 2 1 1 2
Ui(.,s1,θi
2) 1 1 1 1
Ui(.,s2,θi
2) 1 1 1 1
Ui(.,s3,θi
2) 1 1 1 1
Ui(.,s1,θi
3) 1 2 2 1
Ui(.,s2,θi
3) 1 2 2 1
Ui(.,s3,θi
3) 1 2 2 1
Ui(.,s1,θi
4) 2 1 1 2
Ui(.,s2,θi
4) 1 1 1 1
Ui(.,s3,θi
4) 2 1 1 2
Consider the social choice set F(θ) = {x,   x} for all θ ∈ Θ, where x(s) = a for all s ∈ S
and   x(s) = b for all s ∈ S.
F satisﬁes (GEM) since F is constant on Θ. F satisﬁes (GC) since the common knowledge
concatenation satisﬁes Π = {T}. Condition (GIC) is satisﬁed since x and   x are constant.
Since x◦α = x and   x◦α =   x for every deception α, it follows that for every θ ∈ Θ, x◦α ∈
F(θ) and   x◦α ∈ F(θ) for every deception α, and so (GBM) is satisﬁed.
Although F satisﬁes (GC), (GIC), (GEM) and (GBM), it is not implementable. To see





exist equilibrium sets of strategies σx,σ  x ∈ BE( ,θ4) resulting in x and   x on T, respectively.
Consider the set of strategies ˜ σ deﬁned by ˜ σi(si) = σx(si) and ˜ σi(ti) = σ  x(ti). Since each
agent i is completely indiﬀerent at (s2,θi
4), ˜ σ is an equilibrium. Notice that  [˜ σ(s1)] = a and
 [˜ σ(s3)] = b. However, there is no social choice function in F(θ4) which coincides with  [˜ σ]
on T, which is a contradiction. Therefore, F is not implementable. Q.E.D.
The proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 closely follow the respective proofs in Jackson
(1991) established for social choice sets.
Proof of Theorem 2: The following mechanism, which slightly extends the mecha 
nism proposed by Jackson for social choice sets, implements the SCC F if the conditions of
Theorem 2 are met. Let   S = maxi #Si and n = N + N   S. Let V = {0,1,...,   S2}n. Thus
v ∈ V is an (N + N   S) dimensional vector such that each entry is an integer between 0
and   S2. Let Mi = {mi ∈ Θ × Si × ∪θF(θ) × {∅ ∪ V } × X × {∅ ∪ X}|mi
3 ∈ F(mi
1)} and
M = M1 × ... × MN. Partition M into sets:
d0 = {m ∈ M|∃x ∈ F(θ) s.t. m
j = (θ, ,x,∅, ,∅) ∀j},
d
i
1 = {m ∈ M|m / ∈ d0, ∃x ∈ F(θ) s.t. m
j = (θ, ,x,∅, ,∅) ∀j  = i
and m
i = ( , ,x, , ,∅) or ( , ,   x, , , )},
d
i
2 = {m ∈ M|∃x ∈ F(θ) s.t. m
j = (θ, ,x,∅, ,∅) ∀j  = i
8and m
i = ( , ,x, , ,y)},
d3 = {m ∈ M|m / ∈ d1 ∪ d2}.
Let d2 = ∪idi
2 and d1 = ∪idi
1.
Deﬁne the payoﬀ function   : M → X by
 (m) = x(m2), m ∈ d0 ∪ d1,
 (m) = y(m2), m ∈ di
2 and ymi
2 ∈ L(x,Ri(ti,θi)) for all ti ∈ Si,
 (m) = x(m2), m ∈ di
2 and ymi
2 / ∈ L(x,Ri(ti,θi)) for some ti ∈ Si,
 (m) = mi∗
5 (m2), m ∈ d3,
where i∗ is determined as follows: Let I∗ = {i|mi
4  = ∅} and for i ∈ I∗ denote mi
4 by vi. Let
J(i) be the number of j ∈ I∗ such that vi
l = v
j
i for an integerl where N+(j−1)  S < l ≤ N+j   S.
If there exists i ∈ I∗ such that J(i) > J(k) for all k ∈ I∗, then i∗ = i, otherwise i∗ = 1.
Remark 4: For any i and σ there exists vi ∈ V such that such that ˜ σi, where ˜ σi
4(si) = vi
for all si and ˜ σ = σ otherwise, is such that i∗ = i whenever [σ−i, ˜ σi](s) ∈ d3.
The following lemmas establish Theorem 2.
Lemma 3: If F satisﬁes (GIC), then for each θ and x ∈ F(θ) there is a set of strategies
σ which form an equilibrium to the game G(M, ,θ) such that  (σ) = x.
Proof: Given an arbitrary θ ∈ Θ, x ∈ F(θ), we consider σ deﬁned by σi(si) =
(θ,si,x,∅, ,∅). Notice that  [σ(s)] = x(s) for all s ∈ S. We verify that σ is an equilib 
rium by showing that there are no improving deviations. Consider a deviation ˜ mi by i at
si ∈ Si.
If ˜ mi = (˜ θ, ˜ si,x, , ,∅) or ˜ mi = (˜ θ, ˜ si,   x, , , ) then [σ−i(s−i), ˜ mi] ∈ d0 ∪ d1 (where it is
possible that ˜ θ = θ and ˜ si = si). The resulting allocation is x˜ si (on πi(si)). From (GIC) we
know that this is not improving.
If ˜ mi = (˜ θ, ˜ si,x, , ,y), then [σ−i(s−i), ˜ mi] ∈ d2 (where it is possible that ˜ θ = θ and
˜ si = si). If y˜ si ∈ L(x,Ri(ti,θi)) for all ti ∈ Si, then the allocation is y˜ si (on πi(si)), which is
not improving. Otherwise the allocation is x˜ si (on πi(si)), which is not improving by (GIC).
Lemma 4: If F satisﬁes (GC), (GEM) and (GMNV), then for each set of strategies σ
which form an equilibrium to the game G(M, ,θ) there exists z ∈ F(θ) which is equivalent
to  (σ).
Proof: Let σ be an equilibrium to G(M, ,θ) and let α describe the announcement of
s (m2 as a function of s) under σ. For each i, ˆ θ ∈ Θ and x ∈ F(ˆ θ), let Bi
x,ˆ θ = {si : σi(si) =
(ˆ θ,αi(si),x,∅,.,∅)}.
Since σ is an equilibrium,  (σ) satisﬁes (NV H) for α, θ and T − (∪ˆ θ∈Θ ∪x∈F(ˆ θ) Bx,ˆ θ).
This is seen as follows. Suppose that  (σ) does not satisfy (NV H) for α, θ and T −
(∪ˆ θ∈Θ ∪x∈F(ˆ θ) Bx,ˆ θ). Then there exist s ∈ T − (∪ˆ θ∈Θ ∪x∈F(ˆ θ) Bx,ˆ θ), j, and zj such that
zj◦α/C (σ) / ∈ L( (σ),Rj(sj,θj)) for all C ⊂ T − (∪ˆ θ∈Θ ∪x∈F(ˆ θ) Bx,ˆ θ) such that s ∈ C.
Since the failure of (NV H) guarantees the existence of two such agents, and since s / ∈




2. Let ˜ mj be the same as σj(sj)
9except that ˜ m
j
4 = vj as deﬁned in Remark 4, and m
j
5 = zj. Let C be the set of t ∈ πj(sj)
such that [σ−j(t−j), ˜ mj] ∈ d3. The outcome on C is thus zj◦α. Furthermore, s ∈ C, since
[σ−j(s−j), ˜ mj] ∈ d3, and C ⊂ T − (∪ˆ θ∈Θ ∪x∈F(ˆ θ) Bx,ˆ θ). From the design of ˜ mj it follows that
if t ∈ πj(sj) and t / ∈ C, then [σ−j(t−j), ˜ mj] leads to the same outcome as σ. Hence, the
outcome of the deviation is zj◦α on C ∩πj(sj) and  (σ) otherwise. This is improving for j,
which contradicts the fact that σ is an equilibrium.
It has been established that  (σ) satisﬁes (NV H) for α, θ, and T − (∪ˆ θ∈Θ ∪x∈F(ˆ θ) Bx,ˆ θ).
Next, (MNV ) is applied to ﬁnd a social choice function in F(θ) which is equivalent to  (σ).
Suppose that there does not exist a social choice function in F(θ) which is equivalent
to  (σ). By (GMNV ) there exist i, ˆ θ ∈ Θ, x ∈ F(ˆ θ), y, ˜ z,   z and si ∈ ∪  θ∈  ΘxBi
x,  θ, where
  Θx = {θ : x ∈ F(θ)}, such that   z(s) = y◦α when s ∈ ∪  θ∈  ΘxBx,  θ;   z(s) =  [σ(s)] when
s−i ∈ ∪  θ∈  Θ¯ xB
−i
  x,  θ for some   x such that   x  = x; and   z(s) = ˜ z◦α otherwise; and such that
  z / ∈ L( (σ),Ri(si,θi)), while yαi(si) ∈ L(x,Ri(ti,θi)) ∀ti ∈ Si. Therefore i is better oﬀ
submitting [ˆ θ,αi(si),x,vi, ˜ z,y] (where vi is deﬁned in Remark 4) whenever si is observed,
since the resulting outcome is   z on πi(si). This is shown as follows: The deviation puts
the action in di
2 for all s ∈ ∪  θ∈  ΘxBx,  θ, and the outcome is y◦α. The action is in di
1 for all
s ∈ πi(si) such that s−i ∈ ∪  θ∈  Θ¯ xB
−i
  x,  θ for some   x such that   x  = x, and the outcome remains
 [σ(s)]. For any other s ∈ πi(si) the deviation puts the action in d3 with i∗ = i and the
outcome ˜ z◦α(s). Thus the outcome is   z on πi(si) which is strictly preferred by i to  (σ) on
πi(si). This contradicts that σ is an equilibrium, and so the supposition was wrong. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1: The suﬃciency part follows from Theorem 2. In an environment
which satisﬁes (E), (NVH) can never be satisﬁed. Therefore given (GC), (GMNV) and
(GBM) are equivalent. The necessity part of the theorem is now checked.
Let   implement F and deﬁne ˆ F such that ˆ F(θ) = {x|x =  (σ) for some equilibrium σ
in the game G(M, ,θ)}. From the deﬁnition of implementation ˆ F is equivalent to F. It
is obvious that ˆ F satisﬁes (GC). Consider any θ ∈ Θ. ˆ F(θ) satisﬁes (IC) and (BM), by
the proof of Theorem 1 in Jackson (1991). So, ˆ F satisﬁes (GIC) and (GBM). Since the
environment satisﬁes (RDH), E( ) satisﬁes (GEM) by Lemma 2. Thus, ˆ F satisﬁes (GEM)
since ˆ F = E( ). Q.E.D.
10